I'm doing a LOPA calculation -Why do I want to waste time asking the plant operator?
LOPA is a detailed calculation. Why waste time going through it with people like the plant operator? It's complicated enough for the engineer doing the calculation and people like the operators wouldn't understand it anyway! ... Now that I've made your blood boil a bit ... there is a very serious point behind such a rhetorical question.
Layer of Protection Analysis, also known as LOPA, is a calculation of the residual risk used to assess the requirements for safety critical instrument loops. It appears in the process industry guidance standard IEC61511 Part 3 Annex F and now also appears in generic form in the second edition of IEC61508 (the master standard), in part 5.
The analysis requires a team assessment and yet the numbers involved, and the way the calculation is done, leads to a growing body of literature that emphasises the calculation and ignores the team nature of the SIL assessment … which is odd, because IEC61511 Annex F is explicitly based upon HAZOP study, which is a team assessment of risk that includes people like the operator. [1] The body of literature about LOPA is not un-influential. Take, for example, the research paper for the review of LOPA analyses of overfill of fuel storage tanks by Health & Safety Laboratories [2] . Throughout the paper, the numbers used in each of the calculations are heavily criticised, particularly in terms of the lack of supporting evidence, yet throughout the document there is no mention whatsoever of the Team assessment require-ment from part 1 of the standard, and only one mention of HAZOP [3] as referenced in IEC61511 Annex F. The consequence of documents such as these is that there is increasing emphasis placed upon using published data as sources rather than the knowledge of those who actually know the process plant and can offer their experience of the risk being analysed. The result is that LOPA becomes a mystical, complex calculation by a very clever person who can find all the academic references ... without any serious reference to the HAZOP team that is required in the standard.
The structure of the calculation identifies how often the initiating event occurs and the probability that everything that acts against it might fail simultaneously leading to the unwanted event.
It can be a scary calculation to those not trained in LOPA when an example might look like this (see Figure1) :
Structurally the LOPA can be understood as:
SIL assessment is based upon the idea that each risk event may have a number of properties of the process plant design and operation that reduce the unwanted event's likelihood.
The first layer of protection is the process itself.
As it says in the introduction to IEC61511 in Part 1 (page 13):
In most situations, safety is best achieved by an inherently safe process design. If necessary, this may be combined with a protective system or systems to address any residual identified risk. Protective systems can rely on different technologies (chemical, mechanical, hydraulic, pneumatic, electrical, electronic and programmable electronic). To facilitate this approach, this standard • requires that a hazard and risk assessment is carried out to identify the overall safety requirements; • requires that an allocation of the safety requirements to the safety instrumented system(s) is carried out; Notice the emphasis on "inherently safe process design" coming first..
Clive de Salis
Rowan House Ltd Contributed Paper: I'm doing a LOPA calculation -Why do I want to waste time asking the plant operator?
One of the key lessons from Flixborough was that the decisions we make about the chemicals used in the process, and the chemical inventories needed to achieve the desired production, directly impact on safety.
The second layer of safety is that of the operating conditions:
If my dryer has a risk of fire and explosion if the temperature goes above 140°C then an inherently safer dryer will use steam at 105°C for heating instead of hot oil at 250 °C. In the event of an emergency stop my drying material is in contact with a heated surface at 105 °C rather than 250°C.
The third layer of safety is the structural and mechanical design of the vessels themselves. If a dust explosion pressure of sewage sludge is a maximum of 10 bar.g, then why can't we design and build some of the vessels to withstand 15 bar.g? If we could do so then we don't have a safety risk to the operators and maintenance staff because the hazard is contained.
It is the mechanical engineer's job to specify the required vessel design with the right corrosion allowance, the right materials of construction and the pressure rating of the vessel, the flange ratings etc.
The fourth layer of safety is the process control. If I have poor process control then I will often see high pressures or high temperatures, but if I have good process control then normally the control system will be able to cope very well and I will rarely get pressure and temperature alarms. The better the quality of the process control the less frequently I will have a dangerous condition.
The fifth layer of safety is that of the passive safety devices. These are devices that do not rely on any actuation device, electronics, motor etc. Therefore they include things like relief valves and bursting discs.
The sixth layer of safety includes both the powered, active safety devices such as explosion suppression systems and the safety shutdown systems. These are the safety instrumented systems that we must assess and decide how many of them need to have a high degree of integrity.
Since this is the sixth layer of safety, then if the preceding layers offer a good degree of safety when compared to our target risk reduction, then the safety trip does not need to have a high integrity SIL rating.
SIL assessment looks at the process design as a whole to decide if there is a residual risk to be covered by the safety instrumented system. So who is needed for the assessment?
Clearly the approach is a team assessment by those who have good knowledge of the process plant. It is not, by contrast, a complicated calculation by some clever individual working in an office down the corridor with access to the internet from which he can find some interesting references.
The team involved in the SIL assessment is essentially the same team doing the HAZOP study.
Whilst part 3 of IEC61511 is guidance, part 1 of the standard is normative. The need for a team assessment for all of the assessment activities in the lifecycle is in part 1. IEC61511 Part 1 Clause 5 is about the Management of Functional Safety and I draw your attention to clause 5.2.6.1.2 which, at first sight, says something a little bit odd: 5.2.6.1. 2 The membership of the assessment team shall include at least one senior competent person not involved in the project design team. NOTE 1 When the assessment team is large, consideration should be given to having more than one senior competent individual on the team who is independent from the project team.
The inclusion of a person with authority ("senior") who is competent and independent helps guard against going ahead with a poor design at all costs and that is understandable. However, the reference to a team that has amongst it one senior competent person (or a large team having more than one), at first sight seems odd. According to IEC61508 Part 1 clause 6 everyone involved should be competent. It becomes clearer when we look at what it means for LOPA in the SIL assessment stage. IEC61511 Annex F clause F.2 says (page 46):
F.2 Layer of protection analysis
The safety lifecycle defined in IEC 61511-1 requires the determination of a safety integrity level for the design of a safetyinstrumented function. The LOPA described here is a method that can be applied to an existing plant by a multi-disciplinary team to determine a safety instrumented function SIL. The team should consist of the:
• operator with experience operating the process under consideration; • engineer with expertise in the process; • manufacturing management; • process control engineer; • instrument/electrical maintenance person with experience in the process under consideration; • risk analysis specialist.
One person on the team should be trained in the LOPA methodology. The information required for the LOPA is contained in the data collected and developed in the Hazard and Operability analysis (HAZOP study).
If the method requires a "multi-disciplinary team" and "One person on the team should be trained in LOPA" then, by clear implication, it is not necessary to have the whole team trained in LOPA according to IEC61511. Also the evidence for the decision is the HAZOP study, not some interesting academic reference that might, or equally might not, be directly relevant to your process plant application.
Papers and references are helpful where they are genuinely applicable to your process plant so I am not arguing that they have no place. I am noting that the emphasis in the standard is on
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The the HAZOP process conducted by a team that has "experience operating the process under consideration". By contrast there is a growing trend for LOPA studies to emphasise the former and ignore the latter, contrary to the standard. We have enough trouble from SIL certificates and reliability data used for selling instruments being wafted around as evidence. The certificates look reassuring and the data looks good in a laboratory but it is all ignoring the real question about their applicability to your actual process. We don't need to go down the same road with LOPA calculations. There may be academic references to a valve failing open in a 12" pipe that can be referenced in a LOPA calculation but that doesn't mean that the data is good for your 12" pipe and your valve in your process plant.
Funnily enough the person with the most experience on the reliability of devices and the frequency of process upsets on the actual process plant being considered is the operator of the plant. When we look back at clause F.2 quoted above, who is top of the list? It's the "operator with experience operating the process under consideration". Indeed if you examine the list of those recommended for the team doing the study the emphasis is strongly on those who have experience of the process and not on those who have expertise in LOPA calculations.
So why is it that so much emphasis is today being placed upon how many academic references you can find to support your number used in the LOPA report, when the critical evidence is actually the HAZOP study?
Richard Gowland, Technical Director of the European Process Safety Centre, recently noted in an analysis of the final Buncefield report:
"The accident report shows that there was a major deviation between the use of the control systems described in the [COMAH] report and the way they operated in real life, with the report stating: "What was set out in the document and the safety-management systems did not reflect what actually went on at the site." [4] Perhaps those doing the safety risk analyses for controlling the major accident hazards should have asked the plant operators, i.e. those at the top of the list of clause F.2.
A move to put the emphasis on academic references for source data and moving away from tools such as HAZOP study as the basis of LOPA calculations would be a seriously retrograde step because we would be taking the most important person of all out of the loop: The "operator with experience operating the process under consideration".
